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This paper analyses banking and borrowing of carbon emission rights within the framework
of a simple, integrated assessment model.  Breaking the world economy in just two regions it
will be shown: (1) Increasing when-flexibility in greenhouse gas abatement through banking
and borrowing of carbon emission permits has a positive effect on welfare for regions with a
poor endowment in carbon emission rights, but negatively affects rich-endowed regions.  (2)
Intergenerational fairness advocates intertemporal flexibility in greenhouse gas abatement,
irrespectively of the initial allocation of carbon right.  (3) Changing the degree of when-
flexibility has only a small impact on global climate damages.  (4) This is in contrast to the
observation that the initial allocation of carbon emission rights has a significant impact on
atmospheric carbon.
Keywords: Carbon rights, climate policy, integrated assessment, banking and trade.
JEL-Classification: Q4, F2
                                                
♣
 Earlier versions of this paper have been presented at the EMF-IEW workshop (Paris 1999) and at the Tenth
Annual Conference of the European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists (Crete 2000).  This
version has been presented  at the ZEW  International Workshop on Empirical Modeling of the Economy and the
Environment Comments (Mannheim 2001). Suggestions of participants are gratefully acknowledged.  In par-
ticular, we would like to thank Alan S. Manne (Stanford ) and Björn Carlén (Stockholm University).  Of course,
the usual disclaimer applies.
1NPO QHR S T*UVHW R X T$Q
Global climate change defines a public good problem.  Rich and poor, all live in the same
greenhouse.  It is easy to agree on strategies under which everybody will gain.  But since it is
expected that we need to proceed beyond Y*Z8[ \ ]$[ \ ^  policies, there must be some arrangement
for abatement and for burden-sharing.  Economic efficiency ensures maximal potential for
each participant to gain from such an agreement.  This explains, why economists view effi-
ciency as one of the major issues in global climate policy.
International trade of emission rights comes close to the economists’ vision of an effi-
cient internalization of the external effects of global climate change.  To see this, suppose for
a moment that transaction costs are negligible and that information is symmetrically distrib-
uted among parties.  Then, according to the Theorem of Coase, without major changes in the
historical ownership of labor, capital and other conventional resources, Pareto-efficiency in
greenhouse gas abatement can be achieved through international negotiations.
However, the Coase Theorem not only formulates conditions that assure Pareto-
efficiency through voluntary cooperation.  It also states conditions under which it is feasible
to separate the issue of efficiency from that of equity.  Again, suppose for a moment that the
benefits of avoiding climate change are completely captured by the market value of damages
avoided - or, to express it more technically, suppose that global climate change affects pro-
duction, but not utilities.  Then the direct wealth effects of climate change are negligible and
Pareto-efficient abatement policies are independent of the emission shares allocated to each
region (for a discussion, see Manne and Olsen, 1996 or Manne, 1999).
This could have far reaching policy implications.  A sharp distinction might be drawn
between determining the global level of abatement and negotiating the cost sharing rules.  For
example, a credible, internationally accepted agency could set and implement optimal global
emission targets.  Thereafter, carbon emission rights are assigned exogenously to each region
through international negotiations and economic efficiency is achieved through trading theses
rights internationally.  This won’t be an easy task and depends upon the skill of the interna-
tional negotiators.  But it will be less complicated than negotiating simultaneously about the
distribution of shares and emission reduction targets.
Reality, however, can be distracting.  Despite being theoretically convincing there is
serious objection against trading carbon rights on open international markets.  The developing
countries as well as most of the European nations argue that since the industrialized world is
responsible for the majority of greenhouse gases it should take moral responsibility by reduc-
ing their carbon dioxide emissions first.  The Kyoto Protocol reflects both views.  In principle
it allows for trading carbon emission rights.  And it requires that the ANNEX I countries have
to curb their carbon dioxide emissions, while developing countries are – at least in the near
term - free from any duties to abate their greenhouse gas emissions.
The Kyoto protocol is not the focus of this contribution, but a question related to the
Kyoto Protocol is raised in this paper:  If international trade of emission rights is not a realis-
tic policy option, do alternatives exist that also can stipulate efficiency in greenhouse gas
abatement?  Economists’ conventional wisdom tells that the more flexible a policy interven-
tion can be handled by those who should be regulated the lower are the welfare losses due to
the specific policy measure.  For an international agreement on greenhouse gas abatement this
2seemingly implies:  A climate convention that keeps flexibility as high as possible is expected
to be more cost effective than any other proposal.
Trade in carbon dioxide emission permits on open international markets increases the
_a`*b c b8d egf*h*f*d b
 flexibility.  iAj$k lgm ngo*p*o*m k  flexibility in greenhouse gas emissions can be es-
tablished through banking and borrowing of carbon rights.  With banking and borrowing it is
allowed either to save excess emission rights for future use, or to extend present emissions
against future abatement.  This should promote efficiency and reduce the costs of greenhouse
policy simply by transferring abatement activities over time.
Banking of emission permits is by no means a new institution.  The 1990 US Clean
Air Act Amendments explicitly allow for trading and banking of sulfur dioxide (SO2) emis-
sion permits. But there is a major difference between SO2 and carbon dioxide (CO2).  Global
climate change is a stock damage problem.  It is driven by the accumulation of CO2 in the
atmosphere and is not directly associated with the flow of emissions.  Therefore, the timing of
emissions and damages is not coincident as in the case of SO2.  For this reason environmen-
talists conclude that excessive banking or borrowing of permits today could cause quite dras-
tic damages in the future.
This immediately implies the question:  Can banking and borrowing of carbon emis-
sion rights improve welfare, or does it threaten our common future?  Unfortunately, the eco-
nomic literature is not very helpful in answering this question.  First, theoretical analyses are
rather ambiguous about the welfare effects.  For example, Biglaiser et al. (1995) show that
intertemporal permit trade must not be efficient.  Kling and Rubin (1997) conclude that al-
though banking and borrowing emissions must not lead to a social optimum, banning in-
tertemporal flexibility is not optimal.
Second, global trade in carbon emission rights is a feature of many integrated assess-
ment models (for example, see Nordhaus and Yang, 1996, Manne and Richels, 1995, or Bern-
stein et al., 1999), but banking and borrowing of carbon permits is typically not included in
these models.  Only Manne and Richels (1995), Kosobud et al. (1994) and Westskog (2000)
explicitly deal with banking and borrowing of carbon emission rights.  However, these studies
focus on cost efficiency, while taking certain emission reduction scenarios as given.  As such
they do not consider Pareto-efficient greenhouse gas abatement strategies.  And they do not
analyze the trade-offs between equity, efficiency and intertemporal flexibility.
Addressing these issues is the focus of this paper.  We are not interested in considering
gaming or threat situations.  Instead within the framework of an integrated assessment model
this paper analyzes the impact of qar$s tvu w?x*y*x*u s  flexibility on Pareto-efficient greenhouse gas
abatement policies.  In particular the questions will be considered: Can banking and borrow-
ing of carbon permits enforce efficiency?  Does banking and borrowing affect the atmospheric
carbon concentration?  Can the issue of efficiency in greenhouse gas abatement be separated
from the problem of the international allocation of emission shares?
The rest of this paper is organized as follows:  Section 2 carries out some simple ana-
lytical considerations.  Section 3 characterizes the theoretical setting which is based upon a
regional differentiated version of the MEDEA framework (see Stephan and Müller-
Fürstenberger, 1998).  Section 4 discusses the assumptions upon which the different scenarios
of our numerical thought experiments are based and presents the major findings of our nu-
merical analysis.  Section 5 covers some concluding remarks.
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To clarify basic issues, let us carry out a simple analytical exercise.  Suppose, R regions coop-
erate in the solution of the global greenhouse gas problem.  Each region maximizes regional
welfare over a time horizon of two periods.  Global climate change is driven by the accumu-
lation of greenhouse gas emissions.  Economic damages are region-specific and directly enter
into the economy-wide production functions.
In each period t = 1,2 regional consumption cr(t), r = 1,...R, is viewed as a function of
greenhouse gas emissions er(t):
(2.1) cr(t) = Φr(∑jej(t-1))Fr(er(t)).
The regional production functions Fr have the conventional properties, i.e., F′r(er(t)) > 0,
F′′r(er(t)) < 0.  Φr is the region-specific environmental loss factor.  It measures the fraction of
conventional gross output that is at a region’s disposal:  The higher global emissions in the
prior period, the lower is the value of Φr, hence, the lower will be the fraction of conventional
wealth that is available for consumption in region r.
Now suppose, there exist perfect a* g**v(*   flexibility in greenhouse gas abate-
ment.  If economic losses are negligible in the first period, then first order conditions for Pa-
reto-efficiency can be observed through solving the Negishi-problem
(2.2) max{∑rωrWr[Fr(er(1)),Φr (∑jej(1))Fr(er(2))] + λ(E - ∑rer(1) - ∑rer(2))}.
E is the optimal stock of atmospheric carbon.  Wr denotes the regional welfare function, and
ωr  is the so-called Negishi weight attached to region r.  Note that in equilibrium these weights
are proportional to the present value of the respective region’s wealth (see Manne and Olsen,
1996).
From (2.2) immediately follows a Solow-Stiglitz-type condition:
(2.3) ∂Wr/∂cr(1)F′r(er(1)) + (∑jωj Φ′j[Fj(ej(2))])/ωr =  ∂Wr/∂cr(2)F′r(er(2)).
Pareto-efficiency is assured if each region is indifferent between extending carbon emissions
marginally either in period 1 or in period 2.  I.e., welfare gains, ∂Wr/∂cr(2)F′r(er(2)), from in-
creasing carbon emissions in period 2 by one unit have to be equal to the welfare effects of an
additional unit of emissions in period 1.  The later can be decomposed into direct and indirect
effects on regional welfare.  Direct effects, ∂Wr/∂cr(1)F′r(er(1)), are positive, whereas the indi-
rect ones, (∑jωjΦ′j[Fj(ej(2))])/ωr, are negative.  The later are the weighted sum of those losses
which region r imposes on each region j by extending carbon emissions in period 1.  There-
fore, overall losses depend upon the region-specific Negishi weights.
Now suppose that it still were feasible to allocate abatement activities freely in space,
but no possibilities exist to operate a* B B***   flexibility.  Then equation (2.2) has to be
replaced by
4(2.2a) max{∑rωrWr[Fr(er(1)),Φr (∑jej(1))Fr(er(2))] + λ1(E1 - ∑rer(1)) + λ2(E2 - ∑rer(2))},
where Et, t = 1,2, are upper limits of global carbon emissions per period.  Maximizing (2.2a)
implies the first order conditions
(2.3a) ∂Wr/∂cr(1)F′r(er(1)) + (∑jωjΦ′j[Fj(ej(2))])/ωr = λ1/ωr,
(2.3b) ∂Wr/∂cr(2)F′r(er(2)) = λ2/ωr.
If abatement activities can not freely be allocated over time, as is supposed above, then opti-
mality condition (2.3) will be satisfied by chance only.  Therefore, if λ1 > λ2, region r would
have an incentive to borrow carbon emission rights.  Alternatively, region r is motivated to
bank emission rights.
Finally, there are two important remarks.  (1) Negishi-weights are part of the optimal-
ity conditions.  Given their interpretation this suggest that there will be no separability be-
tween efficiency and equity in greenhouse gas abatement.  (2) All regions react identically as
(2.3a) and (2.3b) indicate.  Obviously this is due to the fact that (*  ¡  ¢8£*¤*£*   flexibility still
prevails.  Therefore, let us assume in the following that there were no international trade of
carbon rights, but full ¥(¦*§ ¨:© ª0«*¬*«*© §  flexibility.  Then the first order conditions (2.3a) and
(2.3b) have to be modified:
(2.4a) ∂Wr/∂cr(1)F′r(er(1)) + (∑jωjΦ′j[Fj(ej(2))])/ωr = λr/ωr,
(2.4b) ∂Wr/∂cr(2)F′r(er(2)) = λr/ωr.
Combining equations (2.4a) and (2.4b) yields (2.3), i.e., exactly the same first optimality con-
dition as with full flexibility.  When flexibility makes sure that the shadow price of carbon
rights is equal across time.  Note, however, that full flexibility imposes a stronger constraint
on the allocation of carbon than when flexibility.  With full flexibility, the shadow price of
carbon permits is to be equal in both regions.  Hence, for any pair of regions r ≠ j
ωr ∂Wr/∂cr(1)F′r(er(1))  =  ωj ∂Wj/∂cj(1)F′j(eS(1))
and
ωr ∂Wr/∂cr(2)F′r(er(2)) = ωj ∂Wj/∂Sj(2)F′j(ej(2))
applies, i.e., the marginal rates of substitution must be equated.
Of course, one could push the analytical reasoning further forward.  However, the in-
teractions between the banking and borrowing decisions of the single regions, Pareto-
efficiency greenhouse gas abatement, burden sharing and equity are to complex to be traced
through pure analytical analysis.  Given these complexities numerical simulations might pro-
vide additional insight.
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In designing a numerically traceable model there is always a tradeoff between transparency,
computational efforts and realism.  As the purpose of our numerical thought experiments is
insight not numbers, the theoretical framework is kept deliberately simple.  To relate our re-
sults to the literature, numerical parameters from the RICE (see Norhaus and Yang, 1996),
MERGE (see Manne and Richels, 1995) and MEDEA (see Stephan and Müller-Fürstenberger,
1998) integrated assessment models are taken over into our stylized-facts framework of the
world economy.
There are two regions of the world.  For vividness let them be called North (N) and
South (S).  North consists of the OECD countries including the former Soviet Union.
Roughly this corresponds the so-called ANNEX I parties.  South covers the rest of the world
and should be viewed as an acronym for the developing part of the world.
We are not interested in the issue of intergenerational equity (see Stephan and Müller-
Fürstenberger, 1998).  Therefore, a descriptive rather than a prescriptive view is taken:  Each
region is represented as though it were an infinite-lived agent.  Both, North and South, maxi-
mize the discounted value of consumption.  South enjoys a higher rate of potential GDP
growth than North.  This immediately allows for the possibility of different rates of return on
capital between the two regions (see Manne and Stephan, 1999).
Time is discrete and periods are one decade in length.  Each region produces a homo-
geneous output that may be used for consumption, investment, net exports and to cover en-
ergy costs.  Carbon-free energy resources such as hydro or solar are viewed as back-stop re-
sources.  They are provided at constant, but high marginal costs.  Greenhouse resources such as
oil, gas and coal are supplied at initially lower but increasing costs.
Among the various greenhouse gases, carbon dioxide (CO2) is considered as the most
relevant one.  We neglect the cooling effects of aerosols and the heating effects of greenhouse
gases other than carbon dioxide.  We also neglect the thermal inertia lag between global con-
centrations and climate change.  And we neglect climate externalities that are not valued in a
market.  Instead, global warming is directly attributed to cumulative CO2 emissions and affects
production of different regions of the world in different ways.
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There are two channels through which the environment and the economy interact.  One is the
consumption of greenhouse resources which directly determines the flow of CO2 emissions into
the global atmosphere.  The second link is provided though the concept of the Í$Î Ï Ï Ð?Ñ*Ò Ó ÔÒ Ó  by
which global climate change is translated into its economic impact.
A two-box model is used to cumulate carbon emissions over time, and to translate
them into global concentrations (for a detailed discussion, see Joos et al., 1999).  At any point
of time the stock of atmospheric carbon dioxide, Q(t), is a function of the former one, Q(t-1),
and global past period emissions, s(t-1):
(3.1) Q(t) = ΨQ(t-1) + Θs(t-1).
6Ψ is the factor by which natural abatement reduces the current stock of atmospheric carbon.
Θ is the fraction of past global emissions that has accumulated in the atmosphere.
The model is calibrated such that with zero abatement concentrations will rise from
353 ppm (the 1990 level) to 550 ppm (twice the pre-industrial level) by about 2070.  This
leads to damages of 3.5% of gross output in the South and 1.5% of GDP in the North.  At
other concentration levels, the regional damages are projected as though they were propor-
tional to the square of the increase in concentrations over the 1990 level:
(3.2) Φr(t) = 1 - [Q(t) / Ωr]2.
Ωr marks the critical value of the CO2 concentration.  At this atmospheric CO2 perturbation, pro-
duction in region r = N(orth), S(outh) is reduced to zero.
Φr(t) is the so-called environmental loss factor.  It indicates economic damages induced
by global climate change in region r = N,S.  The corresponding economic costs are measured in
terms of forgone GDP.  I.e., if the atmospheric stock of carbon dioxide is raised to levels Q(t)
above pre-industrial atmospheric carbon, then in region r the productivity of inputs is reduced
such that only Φr(t) percent of the original gross production is at the region’s disposal.
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Principally, there are two ways to reduce CO2 emissions.  One is to replace greenhouse fuels by
carbon-free energy inputs.  A second option is to uncouple economic growth from fossil fuel
consumption by increasing the energy efficiency and by substituting capital for energy.  To cap-
ture both possibilities, the regional production possibilities are represented through a nested con-
stant elasticity of substitution (CES) production functions1:
(3.3) yr(t) = [β1(lr(t)α kr(t)1-α)ε + β2(er(t))ε]1/ε.
Capital kr(t), labor lr(t) and energy inputs er(t) together produce the conventional (i.e., without
climate effects) output, yr(t).  β1 and β2 are CES-coefficients derived from base year data, and
ε is the CES elasticity of substitution between capital/labor and energy.
Substitution between capital and labor is described by a Cobb-Douglas formulation
where α is the corresponding parameter.  Total energy inputs into regional production,
(3.4) er(t) = fr(t) + nr(t),
are the sum of flows of fossil fuels fr(t) and of backstop energy resources nr(t).
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Climate change negatively affects the productivity of the regional economies (see (3.2)).  Only
the fraction Φr(t) of conventional gross output yr(t) is still at their disposal.  Within each region r,
                                                
1
 For better readability parameters do not carry regional indices.
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 Φr(t)yr(t) can be consumed, invested into conventional capital formation, or used to
supply either greenhouse resources or carbon-free energy.
Energy supply costs are measured in units of gross production.  Marginal costs br of car-
bon-free energy are constant, but approximately four times as high as costs of greenhouse re-
sources in the initial year.  Marginal costs ar(t) of greenhouse resources increase over time, de-
pending upon the cumulated extraction in prior periods.
Energy producing and consuming devices can be replaced only gradually.  To prevent an
excessively rapid market penetration once renewable resources become competitive, it is as-
sumed that a global cutback of conventional energy systems cannot be faster than 20% per
decade.  That is:
(3.5) fr(t+1) ≥ 0.8fr(t).
With this formulation there is the possibility that market prices of energy temporarily over-
shoot the marginal costs of the renewable resources.
Regional output is considered as numeraire that can be traded internationally.  Therefore,
if xr(t) denotes net-exports, cr(t) consumption, and ir(t) investment in conventional capital, then
for each period t
(3.6) Φr(t)yr(t) ≥ cr(t) + ir(t) + xr(t) + ar(t)fr(t)+ brnr(t)
is the material balance of commodities produced and traded in region r.  Finally, since net-
imports have to balance out in each period t, condition
(3.7) xN(t) + xS(t) = 0
has to be obeyed globally.
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At any point of time t, the regional endowment kr(t) in physical capital depends upon investment
activities, ir(t-1), and the former capital stock, kr(t-1)
(3.8) kr(t) = (1-υr)kr(t-1) + ir(t-1),
where  υr is the regional capital depreciation rate.
At first glance, the natural approach to the economics of global climate change would be
to employ an overlapping generations model.  It was shown, however, that under reasonable as-
sumptions both an infinitely-lived agent framework and an overlapping generations model will
identify the same greenhouse policies as being efficient (see Stephan et al., 1997).  Therefore,
without loss of generality it is supposed that for striking an optimal balance between con-
sumption, physical investment and greenhouse gas abatement regions follow a Ramsey path.
8Let δ be the social discount rate, then consumption, production, investment into physical
capital and greenhouse gas abatement are determined in each region r = N,S, as if a policy maker
has maximized the discounted sum of the logarithm of consumption, cr(t)
(3.9) Wr = Σt δ-t ln(cr(t)).
If there is no capital mobility and no investment into greenhouse gas abatement, both regions
would develop independently.  But if the regions agree to cooperate on greenhouse abatement,
prices, supplies and demands are generated through a multi-region multi-period general equi-
librium model.  Solutions are obtained via Rutherford’s sequential joint maximization method
- a specialization of the Negishi approach (see Rutherford, 1999).
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Today, there is general agreement that without participation of the developing countries the hu-
man society will not be able to cope with the threat of a global climate catastrophe.  This and the
fact that the Kyoto proposal is of a limited time horizon only suggests (1) to apply a time horizon
of more than a hundred years, (2) to suppose that all parts of the world contribute to the solution
of the global climate problem.
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NOFLEX No when, no where flexibility
BABO Full when flexibility, no where flexibility
PCAP Per capita distribution of carbon shares
GRAND Status Quo distribution of carbon shares
PARETO Efficient distribution of carbon shares
@ABC D?EF G
: Flexibility scenarios2
Given these presumptions five scenarios are considered which differ with respect to the degree
of H?IJ KMLN J OP QP N P R S  as well as in the initial distribution of carbon rights (see Table 4.1).
NOFLEX and BABO represent two polar cases of T UV W=XY V Z[ \[ Y [ ] ^ , while PCAP and GRAND
are polar with respect to the initial assignment of carbon rights (see Figure 4.1).  GRAND is a
so-called grand-fathering allocation as it pins down carbon shares according to the emissions
of the benchmark year (1990).  In PCAP shares smoothly move from grand-fathering to a
                                                
2
 Parameters for the computational experiments are benchmarked against 1990 data (for details, see Appendix I).
And to reduce end-of-time-horizon effects, results are reported till 2100 but computations are carried out till
2200.
9equal-man-equal-rights distribution.  To be more precise, the North’s share declines from a
45% share in 2000 to a 10% share in 2050.  This scenario clearly favors South, whereas
GRAND favors the North.
_5` abdc e?fg hi
 Carbon Shares (North)
Note finally, PARETO is a distinguished scenario.  In PARETO carbon rights are allocated
such that marginal abatement costs are equal across regions.  Therefore, efficiency in green-
house gas abatement is automatically assured.
Before presenting results, let us have a look at the different flexibility designs.  As the
acronym NOFLEX indicates, emission permits cannot be traded nor is it feasible to bank and
borrow them.  Therefore, if mr(t) is the share of carbon emission rights attributed exogenously
to region r, this region is authorized only to consume its own endowment, mr(t)w(t), of carbon
dioxide emissions in period t.  Note, since optimal global CO2 emission targets, w(t), are de-
termined endogenously for each scenario, NOFLEX assures optimality in global greenhouse
gas abatement, but - as we expect - in a costly way.
jlkm n
 flexibility is given if the regional economies are allowed to allocate freely their
endowment of carbon emission rights over time.  BABO refers to this situation:
(4.1) ∑t[mr(t)w(t) - sr(t)] = 0.
As (4.1) indicates, with BABO regional economies may save and borrow carbon emission
permits, but they are not allowed to sell or buy them.
At first glance it is expected that because of increased flexibility, banking and bor-
rowing of carbon emission rights should reduce costs and positively affects welfare.  How-
ever, there could be two countervailing effects.  For a first illustration, consider the PCAP
scenario.  Costs of abatement are borne early and benefits do not accrue until the distant fu-
ture. Therefore, at least the North has an incentive to borrow carbon emission rights.  This
might lead to what environmentalists fear - higher atmospheric carbon concentrations, hence
higher ecological damages and - as a consequence - welfare losses.
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Moreover, as the global climate is a public good, the South is affected by the North’s
borrowing decision.  In other words, if the North operates the borrowing option independ-
ently, this might create intertemporal external effects on the southern economies.  For an op-
timal solution these effects have to be internalized.  I.e., the South has to compensate the de-
lay in greenhouse gas abatement by the North through increasing his abatement activities in
the near distant future.  Again this can imply welfare losses, now for the southern economies.
 lŁ  =     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Does ?   flexibility in greenhouse gas abatement lead to what environmentalists fear - ex-
cessive borrowing of carbon emission permits at early periods?
5 d  ?¡¢ £
: Atmospheric Carbon
The answer is neither no nor really yes (see Figure 4.2).  Increasing ¤ ¥¦ §  flexibility forces
higher atmospheric carbon concentrations.  Depending upon the scenario, peak-levels vary
from 660 ppm to 710 ppm.  This implies market damages between 3.9% and 4.9 % GDP in
the North, while the South experiences GDP-losses in the order of 7.8% to 9.8%.  These are
not dramatic differences, but nevertheless significant.
Our simulations reveal that ¨ ©ª « ª  flexibility as well as ¬ ­® ¯ ® ° ±²³° ¬?­® ²µ´ ¶µ±·±´ ®
flexibility yield exactly the same development of atmospheric carbon as PARETO, irrespec-
tively to the initial allocation of carbon rights.  This supports the well-known hypothesis that
the optimal carbon stock is independent of the initial allocation emission shares if it were fea-
sible to trade carbon rights on open international markets.  However, if ¸?¹º » ºl¼ ½¿¾À¾¼ º  flexi-
bility is absent and Á?ÂÃ Ä flexibility prevails only, the Coasian argument does not apply.
It might be viewed as a surprise that Å ÆÇ È Ç&É ÊÌËÍËÉ Ç flexibility is associated with the
highest carbon levels.  However, there two explanations.  First, our model does not include
non-market damages.  Negative external effects of global climate change can be fully inter-
nalized by assigning carbon emissions rights, and Pareto-efficiency is assured through trade.
Second, trade-induced economic growth outweighs higher climate damages.  That is, an effi-
ciently organized economy may provide higher green GDP by producing more conventional
output as well as higher emissions.
ÎÏ Ð
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 flexibility does not significantly affect the atmospheric accumulation of carbon, but the
development of regional emissions changes notably as Figures 4.3a,b and 4.4a,b illustrate.
à5á âãdä å?æç èé
: Carbon Emissions North GRAND
ê5ë ìídî ï ðñ òó
: Carbon Emissions South GRAND
It is immediate from Figures 4.3a and 4.3b that a region’s decision either to bank or to borrow
carbon permits depends upon its initial carbon share.  In GRAND, North uses the banking
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option to postpone emissions relative to NOFLEX almost till the end of the century.  The
South, in turn, heavily borrows carbon permits, in particular during the decades after 2030.
This indicates that under GRAND burning fossil fuels has a relatively high marginal value to
the South, whereas the North reacts by cutting back emissions.
ô5õ ö÷dø ù?úû úü
: Carbon Emissions North PCAP
ý5þ ß   	
: Carbon Emissions South PCAP
If carbon rights are allocated according to PCAP, borrowing appears favorable to North while
South banks (see Figures 4.4a and 4.4b).  The argument behind this observation is the same as
in GRAND with reversed roles.
Both in the PCAP and the GRAND distribution of carbon rights 
   flexibility
stipulates emissions to approach the PARETO path.  Indeed, till the middle of our century
PARETO and BABO coincide.  Moreover, as can be observed for the numerical parameters
employed, one region’s borrowing is exactly offset by the other region’s banking.  This ex-
plains the almost negligible differences in atmospheric carbon.
Summing up, our simulations suggest:  (1) Differences between NOFLEX and BABO
are small in terms of atmospheric carbon concentration, while differences in the initial alloca-
tion of carbon rights significantly influence carbon peak levels.  (2) If banking and borrowing
of carbon rights is allowed, this affects regional emissions.  In particular, one region’s bor-
rowings are completely offset by the other region’s banking.  (3) If carbon emission rights are
in addition traded on an open international market, then allowing for banking or borrowing
does not impose additional costs in terms of climate change.
     ff fi fl  
Now let us single out how the different flexibility regimes affect present values of regional
welfare.  If expressed in per cent deviations from PARETO values, welfare effects are ex-
tremely small (see Figures 4.5a and 4.5b).  Typically, they stay below the half-percent margin.
ffi  !"# $&%' ()
: Overall utility North
* + ,-. /01 23
: Overall utility South
That the initial allocation of carbon rights influences the present value of regional welfare is
unambiguous.  Independent of the degree of flexibility in greenhouse gas abatement, North is
best with GRAND (see Figure 4.5a).  Relative to PARETO the North gains both in the BABO
and the NOFLEX scenario.  In PCAP, North looses welfare relative to PARETO both with
and without 456 7  flexibility.  As such, North’s best choice would be GRAND - independent
of the degree of intertemporal flexibility.
For the South, the situation is just reversed (see Figure 4.5b).  If the South had a
choice, in any case he would vote for PCAP.  With GRAND, compared to PARETO the
South suffers welfare losses both in the BABO and NOFLEX scenario.
12
Our results show that contrary to the win-win situation that can be observed if there is
free trade in carbon rights, banking and borrowing is a win-loose option.  Regions with a high
initial endowment of carbon rights are suffering from 8&9: ;  flexibility, whereas regions which
are poorly equipped only can gain from intertemporal flexibility in greenhouse gas abatement.
Adding <=> ? >  flexibility even enhances this situation (not shown in the Figures).  This is not
to big a surprise.  Economists’ conventional wisdom tells that welfare can decrease with @&AB C
D EGFHFD
B  flexibility.  First, an international agency which seeks to promote Pareto-efficiency
by issuing permits based on flows of emissions looses control over the dating of emissions, if
banking and borrowing is allowed.  Second, Leiby and Rubin (2001) have shown that banking
can lead to welfare losses unless carbon emission rights are traded at the correct intertemporal
exchange rate.  The latter is determined by the ratio of current marginal stock damages to dis-
counted future value of marginal stock damages less the decay rate of emissions.
IJ KML NO P Q RST U RQ VWYX Z[\SU T VW
Present values bear no information about the intertemporal distribution of welfare.  However,
since regional welfare is directly related to the logarithm of consumption (see (3.9)), per-
capita consumption might be used as rough indicator, how welfare is distributed over time.
] ^ _`a b&cd ef
: Consumption North GRAND
g h ijk lmn op
: Consumption South GRAND
q r stu v&wx yz
: Consumption North PCAP
{ | }~  
: Consumption South PCAP
Again PARETO is taken as reference.  Compared to other scenarios, it exhibits the lowest
intertemporal variations in per-capita consumption.  As such PARETO is not only efficient,
but can also be regarded as ‘fair’.
As Figures 4.6a,b and 4.7a,b suggest both the initial allocation of carbon rights and the
degree of abatement flexibility affect the intertemporal distribution of welfare.  To see this, let
us first consider the GRAND initial allocation of carbon rights.  In the North there are winners
and looser in term of per-capita consumption relative to PARETO.  In the middle of this cen-
tury there is a trough in per-capita consumption, making people worse in any flexibility sce-
nario if compared to PARETO.  Nevertheless, there are obvious differences among the differ-
ent flexibility scenarios.  Intertemporal distribution effects are more pronounced in NOFLEX
than in BABO.  As such BABO seems favorable from the perspective of intergenerational
fairness, although NOFLEX is superior from an overall utility perspective.
In South, reducing flexibility has the same impact on consumption as in North, but
even more pronounced (see Figure 4.6b).  NOFLEX leaves generations for a whole century
worse than PARETO, again with a trough in the middle of this century.     flexibility
flattens this pattern - just as it did in North.
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Now let us turn to the PCAP initial allocation of carbon rights.  As can be seen from
Figures 4.7a and 4.7b, the impact of different flexibility regimes is less pronounced than it
was in the GRAND allocation.  In the North, the distributional effect of Ł   flexibility is
smooth, with generations living in the middle of the 21st century gaining most.  In the South
per-capita consumption is almost insensitive against changing the degree of    
flexibility.  Some generations are winning, some are losing from BABO.  In the very long-run
(beyond 2100), NOFLEX is clearly superior to BABO.
To sum up,    flexibility is a mean to foster intergenerational fairness across all re-
gions.  Keeping in mind, how small the effects are on present values of regional welfare,
banking and borrowing seem to be a policy tool that allows to scope with the issue of inter-
generational distribution effects.
& Y¡ ¢ £Y¤ ¥  Y¤
Among economists there is almost general agreement that ¦§¨ © ¨  flexibility should be an inte-
gral part of an international treaty on climate policy.  The reasons are well-known.  Interna-
tional trade of carbon emission rights ensures cost-efficiency irrespectively to the initial allo-
cation of carbon rights and allows to separate the issues of efficiency from that of equity.
ª«¬ ­ ¬
 flexibility is not in the focus of this paper.  Instead, banking and borrowing of
carbon emission rights is considered as an alternative for creating flexibility in greenhouse gas
abatement.  However, does w ®¯ °  flexibility work in a similar direction as trade in carbon
rights does?  In principle the answer is ‘yes’, but needs some qualifications.
In contrast to ±&²³ ´ ³  flexibility w µ¶ ·¹¸ º¼»½»¸ ¶  flexibility does not guarantee that the
optimal carbon accumulation is independent of the initial allocation of carbon rights.  Differ-
ent initial sharing rules clearly influence the development of atmospheric carbon concentra-
tion.  Coasian separability does not apply, although ¾&¿À Á  flexibility moves the development
of atmospheric carbon towards the Pareto-efficient concentration - however, without full con-
vergence.
W ÂÃ Ä Ã  flexibility represents a win-win situation.  All regions can improve welfare
through trading carbon emission rights.  ÅÆÇ È flexibility creates a win-loose option.  Regions
that have a high initial endowment in carbon rights suffer from intertemporal flexibility, while
regions with a small carbon budget can gain from it.  Therefore, ÉÊË Ì  flexibility is likely to
counteract unequal initial distributions of carbon shares.  This is consistent with our observa-
tion that ÍÎÏ Ð  flexibility seems to support fairness between generations and across regions.
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